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COMMENT 
EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME AND 
VIVISEPULTURE: PREVENTING 
CREDIT-DEFAULT-SWAP HOLDERS 
FROM PUSHING COMPANIES INTO 
PREMATURE GRAVES BY REFUSING TO 
NEGOTIATE RESTRUCTURINGS  
INTRODUCTION 
Our financial industry faced nearly unparalleled distress in 2008.1 
Numerous banking and insurance institutions whose names were 
synonymous with the triumph of American capitalism—e.g., Lehman 
Brothers2 and AIG3—either filed for bankruptcy or were bailed out by 
                                                                                                                   
1 See Magnifico, USA Was 3 hrs Away from Economic, Political Collapse in September 
2008, DAILY KOS (Feb. 9, 2009, 8:58 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/02/09/695504/-
USA-was-3-hrs-away-from-Economic,-Political-Collapse-in-September-2008?detail=hide 
(“According to Rep. Paul Kanjorski (D) (PA–11), in mid-September of 2008, the United States 
of America came just three hours away from the collapse of the entire economy. In a span of 2 
hours, $550 billion was drawn out of money market accounts in an electronic run on the 
banks.”). 
2 See CNBC with Wires, Lehman Brothers Files For Bankruptcy, Scrambles to Sell Key 
Business, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2008), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708143/Lehman_Brothers_Files_For_Bankruptcy_Scrambles_to_Sel
l_Key_Business (discussing the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). 
3 Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven, & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S. to 
Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. 
JOURNAL at A1 (Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html 
(discussing the federal government’s bailout of AIG). 
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the federal government to prevent their failure. Meanwhile, 
competitors bought out other stalwarts facing potential bankruptcies.4  
In 2012, the distress has not entirely subsided, and the financial 
industry continues to recover.5 More troubling, however, is the effect 
the financial industry’s collapse has had on the broader economy.6 
Between January 2008 and February 2010, the United States lost 8.8 
million jobs.7 Simultaneously, the unemployment rate ballooned from 
roughly five percent to nearly ten percent.8 Unsurprisingly, business 
bankruptcies increased throughout the country over a similar 
timeframe.9  
                                                                                                                   
4 JP Morgan Chase bought Bear Stearns, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a 
Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at A1, available at , 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html, and Washington Mutual, see Robin 
Sidel, David Enrich, & Dan Fitzpatrick, WaMu Is Seized, Sold off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest 
Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html, while Bank of America bought 
Meryl Lynch. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Sold, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at A1, available at, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html (discussing the sale of Merrill 
Lynch and the pending bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers). 
5 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (The) (GS), YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2012, 
7:59 PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=GS+Interactive#chart1:symbol=gs;range=5y;indicator=volu
me;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on;source=undefined (Goldman Sachs’ 
stock traded at more than $230.00 per share in October 2008, while in February 2012 it has 
traded around $120.00 per share); Bank of America Corporation Com (BAC), YAHOO! FINANCE 
(Feb. 13, 2012, 7:59 PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=BAC+Interactive#chart1:symbol=bac;range=5y;indicator=v
olume;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on;source=undefined (Bank of 
America Corporation’s stock went from more than $50.00 per share to under $10.00 over the 
same time period); Citigroup, Inc. Common Stock (C), YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:59 
PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=C+Interactive#symbol=C;range=5y (Citigroup’s stock 
went from roughly $140.00 per share to about $35.00 per share over the same time period). 
6 See Howard Wial, Siddharth Kulkarni, & Richard Shearer, MetroMonitor: Tracking 
Economic Recession and Recovery in America’s 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 
METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/Metro/metro_monitor/2011_12_metro_moni
tor/1215_metro_monitor.pdf (discussing the general economic impact).  
7 Annalyn Cenky, Will Obama Break Even on Jobs?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 11, 2012, 8:44 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/11/news/economy/obama_jobs_record/index.htm. 
8 Unemployment Rate – Not Seasonally Adjusted, GOOGLE: PUBLIC DATA (Feb. 10, 
2012), 
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_&met_y=unemployment_rate
&idim=country:US&fdim_y=seasonality:S&dl=en&hl=en&q=unemployment+statistics#!ctype
=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=unemployment_rate&fdim_y=seasonality:U&scale_
y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:US&ifdim=country&tstart=1200200400000
&tend=1268456400000&hl=en&dl=en.  
9 In 2007, there were 28,332 business bankruptcy filings, while in 2008–2010, there were 
43,546; 60,837; and 56,282 respectively. Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year 
(1980–2011), AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (last visited Feb. 13, 2012, 10:38 PM), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=63164&TEM
PLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.  
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Many pundits have argued that a “housing bubble” caused this 
collapse.10 Academic research offers the same conclusion but with 
additional insight into why and how the decline of property values 
could lead to catastrophic results for the broader economy.11 One of 
the more nuanced observations points to the role of complex financial 
instruments in exacerbating the economic decline.12 This observation 
led government officials to enact regulations that could prevent this 
economic chaos from reoccurring.13 The result was the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).14 
Dodd-Frank’s drafters focused, in part, on the regulation of 
sophisticated financial instruments because of their direct relationship 
to the turmoil.15 One such financial instrument was the credit default 
swap.16 
A credit default swap is a contract under which the seller agrees to 
pay the purchaser if a negative event befalls a debt instrument; in 
return, the purchaser agrees to pay the seller a percentage of the 
payout either up front or over time.17 Credit default swaps played an 
integral role in the system-wide collapse of the financial markets,18 as 
                                                                                                                   
10 See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 11, 2009, at A15, available at, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123672965066989281.html. 
(discussing the housing bubble and its potential origins); Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith, 
From Bubble to Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123897612802791281.html (discussing historical bubbles, 
including the housing bubble). But see Casey B. Mulligan, Was it Really a Bubble?, ECONOMIX 
(May 5, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/what-it-really-a-
bubble/ (questioning whether a bubble actually existed and arguing the housing bubble was a 
response to market fundamentals).  
11 See, e.g., Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the 
Spotlight on Security and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools 
of Liquidity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1040 (2010) (discussing the development and impact 
of dark liquidity trading); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Saving the Global Financial System: 
International Financial Reforms and United States Financial Reform, Will They Do The Job?, 
43 NO. 1 UCC L. J. ART. 3, 4 (2010) (discussing the causes of the financial crises).  
12 See, e.g., MICHAEL M. LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 62 
(2011) (discussing, generally, the role of derivatives in the financial turmoil). 
13 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which Congress 
passed in 2009, claims “[t]o provide for financial regulatory reform, to protect consumers and 
investors . . .” H.R. 4173, 111th Con. (1st Sess. 2010). 
14 Id. 
15 See id. (Dodd-Frank also aims “to regulate the over-the-counter derivatives market”). 
16 Id. 
17 For an in-depth discussion of credit default swaps, see infra Part I.A. 
18 See Yves Smith, So Why Hasn’t the Credit Default Swap Casino Been Shut Down, 
NAKED CAPITALISM (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/03/so-why-hasnt-
the-credit-default-swaps-casino-been-shut-down.html (“Credit default swaps played a much 
more central role in the financial crisis than is widely understood.”); Jessie Westbrook & David 
Scheer, Credit Swaps Must Be Regulated Now, SEC’s Cox Says (Update4), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
23, 2008, 5:03 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajXNMd45_cio (“U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox said Congress should ‘immediately’ 
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they tied the fate of large amounts of capital to shaky debt 
instruments and intertwined the risks of massive financial 
institutions.19  
Although Dodd-Frank’s regulation of credit default swaps may 
succeed in stemming some of the systemic risk that these derivative 
financial instruments create, the statute does not prevent credit-
default-swap holders from forcing companies into bankruptcies that 
otherwise would not occur. Specifically, under current law, parties 
who invest in a company’s debt and who have also purchased a credit 
default swap on that investment have incentive to resist that 
company’s attempts to restructure its debt in order to avoid 
bankruptcy, even when a restructuring would be beneficial to other 
creditors and the economy at large. In an effort to rectify this 
inefficient outcome, this Comment proposes a rule that Congress 
should adopt to improve the efficacy of its credit-default-swap 
regulation.  
First, this Comment outlines the basics of the credit default swap, 
discusses the relationship between the credit-default-swap market and 
the financial crisis of 2008, and describes the way Dodd-Frank 
addresses the systemic problems that credit default swaps cause. 
Next, it explains that Congress’s pre- and post-Dodd-Frank regulation 
of credit default swaps has already led to bankruptcies that otherwise 
would not have occurred and will continue to do so. Finally, it 
proposes a rule that solves this problem: Congress should allow the 
seller of a credit default swap to refuse to make a payout to a 
purchaser that does not negotiate a restructuring with the debt issuer 
underlying the swap. 
I. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: THE BASICS 
A. What Is a Credit Default Swap? 
Conceived in the aftermath of Drexel Burnham Lambert’s20 
creation of collateralized debt obligations21 in the late 1980s,22 a 
                                                                                                                    
 
grant authority to regulate credit-default swaps amid concern the bets are fueling the global 
financial crisis.”). 
Also, consider the role that credit default swaps may have or are having in economies 
throughout the world. See, e.g., Abigail Moses, Credit Default Swaps on Greek, Portuguese 
Government Bonds Jump to Records, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2011, 
4:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-26/credit-default-swaps-on-greek-
portuguese-government-bonds-jump-to-records.html. 
19 See infra Part I.C. 
20 Ironically, this investment firm filed for bankruptcy in 1990. Kurt Eichenwald, THE 
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credit default swap is a “promise[ ] to make a specified payment in 
the event a particular debt instrument experiences an event of default, 
such as a payment default or if the issuer files for bankruptcy 
protection.”23 In other words, credit default swaps are “derivative 
instruments that seek to mitigate the risk of failure of a security 
through purchase of insurance against the occurrence of such 
event.”24 For example, suppose Sara purchases Company X’s bonds 
but is worried that X may be unable to repay her according to the 
terms of her investment. She could turn to a third party who, for a 
price, will guarantee her a return by agreeing to pay her if X fails to 
do so.25 The contract between Sara and the third party is a credit 
default swap.  
To purchase a credit default swap, the buyer makes “a single 
upfront payment, or possibly a series of payments, in exchange for the 
counterparty’s obligation to make . . . [a] payment that is contingent 
upon the occurrence of any one of a specified set of possible credit 
events.”26 In this way, the instruments are similar to insurance 
systems we have in society.27 Consider Ben’s purchase of car 
insurance against the possibility of damage or theft. Ben pays the 
insurance company a monthly payment, and the insurance company 
assumes the risk of catastrophic damage to the car by promising to 
pay Ben if such a catastrophic event occurs. When the buyer of a 
                                                                                                                    
 
COLLAPSE OF DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT; Drexel, Symbol of Wall St. Era, is 
Dismantling; Bankruptcy Filed, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES, Feb. 14, 1990, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/14/business/collapse-drexel-burnham-lambert-drexel-symbol-
wall-st-era-dismantling-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.   
21 “Collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, are created by banks that pool together 
otherwise unrelated debt-instruments, like bonds, and then sell shares of that pool to investors.”  
Collateralized Debt Obligations, N.Y. TIMES: TIMES TOPICS (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/collateralized-debt-
obligations/index.html.  
22 P.M. Vasudev, Default Swaps and Director Oversight: Lessons from AIG, 35 J. CORP. 
L. 757, 760 (2010).  
23 John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A Review of Recent Derivatives Litigation, 16 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 88 (2011). The event triggering the payment from the third 
party to the individual does not necessarily have to be default. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default 
Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access 
to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 52 (2011) (Credit Default Swaps “may 
also protect against debt restructuring or credit rating downgrade”.). 
24 William T. Coleman, Jr., A Brief History of Banking and Investment Regulation in the 
US and a Challenge to Remain the Greatest Nation in the World, 99 KY. L.J. 1, 4 (2010).  
25 For a variation of this simple example, see Kress supra note 23 at 52; see also Alex 
Blumberg, Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness, NPR (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96395271&ft=1&f=94427042 
(explaining the basic principles of a default credit swap).  
26 Finnerty & Pathak, supra, note 23 at 88.  
27 See Coleman, Jr., supra note 24, at 4 (claiming that “[e]ssentially, a credit default swap 
is a life insurance policy on a security”). 
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credit default swap also owns the investment on which the instrument 
is based, the swap operates as insurance. 
Not all credit default swaps, however, serve the traditional 
insurance function.28 Instead, investors who do not own a debt 
instrument29—e.g., bonds, or notes—but believe that the institution 
issuing the debt will face some type of crisis in the future buy credit 
default swaps from third parties for “protection” against that crisis.30 
Imagine Tim taking out “insurance” on Ben’s car—without having 
any ownership stake in the vehicle—because he believes someone 
will soon steal it.31 Effectively, investors pay third parties monthly 
premiums or up-front payments with the hope that a credit event 
befalls the debt instrument, leaving the investor with a large payout 
from his credit default swap. When investors use swaps in this 
manner, it is easy to view them as speculators32 or gamblers.33  
B. The Benefits of Credit Default Swaps 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the credit-default-swap market 
provides two main benefits to the broader economy. First, credit 
                                                                                                                   
28 See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at WK9, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhornb.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 
(explaining that we can “[c]all [credit default swaps] insurance if you like, but it’s not the 
insurance most people know”). 
29 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 679 
(2010) (“There is no requirement that one actually own the underlying credit instrument in order 
to purchase a credit default swap.”). 
30 See Kress, supra note 23, at 53 (“[T]he majority of the [credit-default-swap] market is 
now comprised of so-called ‘naked’ [credit default swaps] that enable protection buyers to bet 
against the credit quality of assets they do not own.”). 
31 For a similar explanations, see Blumberg, supra note 25 (“Let’s say there’s a guy 
named Frank and he has a life insurance policy. When he dies, the beneficiary gets a million 
dollars. Now imagine a whole bunch of other people saying, ‘I want a million dollars if he dies, 
too.’ And so they take out life insurance policies on Frank.”); Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 28 
(“It’s more like buying fire insurance on your neighbor’s house.”).  
32 Vasudev, supra note 22, at 764 (“Thus, multiple swaps for CDOs complete the 
transition of default swaps from their conception as hedges against risk into instruments of pure 
financial speculation.”); Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap 
Regulatory Initiatives: A New World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
169, 209–210 (2009) (discussing the speculative nature of the credit-default-swap market); 
Kress, supra note 23, at 52 (“Market participants use [credit default swaps] in a variety of ways, 
including hedging and speculation.”). 
Although an investor may still be hedging against other bets he has in the market, his use 
of the credit default swap without any equity in the underlying asset is, effectively, “the 
buying . . . of something with the expectation of profiting from price fluctuations,” in this case 
the value of the asset decreasing to a level that causes the credit default swap to trigger. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (8th ed. 2004). 
33 Andrew M. Kulpa, Minimal Deterrence: The Market Impact, Legal Fallout, and 
Impending Regulation of Credit Default Swaps, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 293, 298 (2009) 
(“[Credit-default-swap] agreements also resemble gambling or gaming contracts. However, 
gaming contracts, much like insurance contracts, face strict governmental oversight.”).  
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default swaps allow investors and creditors to hedge against risk by 
permitting them to “offset[ ] their exposure to the risk of loss that is 
inherent in lending arrangements such as credit facilities or the 
acquisition of debt securities.”34 More specifically: 
Credit default swaps separate the risk of loss that a creditor 
faces upon entering into a debt investment and redistributes 
the risk among the creditor and its credit default swap 
counterparties. As a result of the redistribution, risk is not 
concentrated in the same manner that risk is concentrated 
between a single borrower and a single lender engaged in a 
traditional credit arrangement.35 
In addition to benefiting investors and creditors, this risk-shifting 
helps the broader financial market because, “[i]f derivative contracts 
allow an agent such as a producer to hedge the risk of cash market 
price fluctuations[,] this may reduce the risk premium that the 
produce[r] will apply in making investment decisions.”36 Such a 
reduction decreases producers’ cost of production and, therefore, may 
lead to lower prices for consumers.37  
Second, the credit-default-swap market assists the broader 
economy by acting as a pricing mechanism “by giving an incentive to 
agents to become better forecasters of market conditions in the 
future.”38 The market helps “allocat[e] resources to the most valuable 
uses”39 because, “if in the future there will be an increase in demand 
that will lead to a price increase, then [market participants] who buy 
derivatives contracts . . . will bid up their prices in anticipation of that 
demand increase.”40 Thus, producers of financial instruments are 
better able to understand what to produce, for whom, and at what 
price.41  
                                                                                                                   
34 Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 199 (2011). 
35 Id. at 200 (citation omitted). 
36 Ronald W. Anderson, Credit Default Swaps: What Are the Social Benefits and Costs?, 
BANQUE DE FRANCE FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, No. 14, July 2010 at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financier
e/etude01_rsf_1007.pdf.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; cf. Floyd Norris, The Naked Truth on Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 
2010, at B1 (“To most on Wall Street, the answer is obvious: let markets function. My buying 
that insurance will probably drive up the price, and serve as a market indication that people are 
worried about the credit, which is good because it gives a warning to others.”). 
41 See Anderson, supra note 36, at 2. 
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C. The Role of Credit Default Swaps in the Great Recession 
Although credit default swaps may appear to be a rather harmless 
way for investors to make money, one of the United States’ most 
famous investors, Warren Buffet, once described them as “financial 
weapons of mass destruction.”42 At the heart of this ominous 
description is Buffet’s understanding that credit default swaps 
produce systemic risk.43 That systemic risk becomes apparent when 
one understands that numerous investors can purchase credit default 
swaps on the same type of investment or even the same investment 
itself.44 For instance, consider the following hypothetical. 
First, imagine that Investor L, who owns Company X’s bonds, 
purchases a credit default swap from Insurance Firm Z to hedge 
against the risk that X will fail to make payment on those bonds. 
Under this deal, Z agrees to pay L $1,000,000 if X fails to meet its 
obligations so long as L makes monthly payments to Z of $1,000. 
Second, Insurance Firm Z, confident that X will not fail to make 
payments, strikes the same deal with Investors M and N. Third, 
Investor L, noticing that other investors believe that X may go 
bankrupt, originates her own credit default swap with a $1,000,000 
payout if X fails and sells it to Mutual Fund A. In return, A promises 
to pay L $2,000 per month. Not to be outsmarted, Investors M and N 
also originate and sell credit default swaps to Mutual Funds B and C, 
respectively, for $2,000 per month.45 
At this point, Mutual Funds A, B, and C hold credit default swaps 
protecting against X’s bankruptcy that they purchased from Investors 
L, M, and N. L, M, and N also hold credit default swaps protecting 
against X’s bankruptcy that they purchased from Insurance Firm Z. L, 
M, and N think that they have made out well: (1) they each are 
making $2,000 per month from Mutual Fund A, B, or C, while only 
paying $1,000 per month to Insurance Firm Z; and (2), even if 
Company X files for bankruptcy, they can each pay $1,000,000 to 
                                                                                                                   
42 James B. Kelleher, Buffet’s “Time Bomb” Goes off on Wall Street, REUTERS (Sep. 18, 
2008, 1:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-derivatives-credit-
idUSN1837154020080918.  
43 Id. (“When historians write about the current crisis, much of the blame will go to the 
slump in the housing and mortgage markets, which triggered the losses, layoffs[,] and 
liquidations sweeping the financial industry. But credit default swaps—complex derivatives 
originally designed to protect banks from deadbeat borrowers—are adding to the turmoil.”). 
44 Johnson, supra note 34, at 212 (“During the recent financial crisis, investigations 
revealed that a concentration of significant financial institutions participated in the credit default 
swap market. This concentration of significant financial market participants contributed to 
systemic risk and moral hazard concerns.”). 
45 This explanation stems from an example of a credit-default-swap market in Blumberg, 
supra note 25. 
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their respective Mutual-Fund counterparties with the $1,000,000 that 
Z has agreed to pay them upon the occurrence of the same event.  
Now, assume X files for bankruptcy. Theoretically, Z would pay 
$1,000,000 to each of the Investors and those Investors in turn would 
pay $1,000,000 to each of the Mutual Funds. But what if Z cannot 
afford to pay $1,000,000 to the three Investors? The result is systemic 
destabilization, as investors across markets are injured—either the 
Investors or the Mutual Funds take the significant loss of 
$1,000,000.46  
Sadly, this is not markedly different from what actually occurred 
when the housing market crashed in 2008.47 Indeed, in 2007, the 
credit-default-swap market reached an “estimated . . . $62.2 
trillion,”48 with many of the credit-default-swap contracts tied to 
financial instruments linked to home mortgages.49 And, importantly, 
“investigations [have] revealed that a concentration of significant 
financial institutions participated in the credit default swap market.”50 
For instance, American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”), faced 
daunting financial obligations due to credit default swaps when 
property values rapidly declined:  
The government rescued AIG . . . to prevent it from going 
bankrupt because it had promised a lot of money, which it 
didn’t have, to people holding credit default swap agreements 
                                                                                                                    
46 See id. (“Satyajit Das, a risk consultant with nearly 20 years of experience working with 
credit default swaps, says that netting works fine as long as everyone stays in business. ‘If the 
chain breaks down anywhere where one party does not actually honor their contracts, then the 
losses multiply rapidly,’ he says. ‘It links everybody together in this unholy chain and so what 
happens is if one party has a problem, then everybody else has a problem.’”). 
47 Vasudev, supra note 22, at 763–64 (citing Michael S. Gibson, Credit Derivatives and 
Risk Management, 92 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., no. 4, 2007 at 25, 39) 
(“[The amount of credit default swaps in the market], which is truly staggering, was most likely 
in excess of the underlying debt, which suggests the possibility of multiple swaps for the 
portfolios. In other words, a number of default swaps were issued for a single debt obligation. 
Michael Gibson has pointed out, ‘[a]s the credit derivative market has grown, it has become 
common for the notional amount of CDS outstanding referencing a particular issuer to be larger 
than the face value of the issuer's bonds outstanding.’ This fact clearly points towards multiple 
swaps for debt securities.”).  
48 Vasudev, supra note 22, at 763; see also Clearing the Fog: Credit Derivatives Continue 
to Boom, But the Old Order Is Under Threat, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/11060804?story_id=11060804 (“The overall market for over-
the-counter derivatives shot up to $455 trillion at the end of 2007. Some $62 trillion of that were 
credit-default swaps (CDSs), whose supercharged growth continues in spite of the crunch.”).  
49 Andrea S. Kramer, Alton B. Harris, & Robert A. Ansehl, The New York State Insurance 
Department and Credit Default Swaps: Good Intentions, Bad Idea, 22 J. OF TAX’N & REG. OF 
FIN. INST., no. 3, at 22, 22 n.1 (Jan./Feb. 2009); see also Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: 
The Next Crisis?, TIME (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html (“[Credit default swaps] 
typically apply to municipal bonds, corporate debt and mortgage securities . . . .”). 
50 Johnson, supra note 34, at 212. 
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with the company. ‘From recollection, I don’t believe the 
number got to $500 billion, but it was certainly in totality 
around $400 billion,’ sa[id] former CEO Martin Sullivan.51  
Wells Fargo, through its purchase of Wachovia,52 also faced 
considerable credit-default-swap liability,53 and “Bear Stearns, a top-
ten actor in [credit default swaps], [was] rescued partly because of the 
fear of chaos if such a large counterparty [in the credit-default-swap 
market] were to fold.”54 Likewise, Lehman Brothers’ former Chief 
Executive Officer, Richard Fuld, “blamed his firm’s collapse partly 
on ‘destabilizing’ forces including the escalating cost of swaps on the 
investment bank’s debt.”55  
In total, estimates suggest that credit default swap “strategies . . . 
contributed to $1.82 trillion in write-downs and losses amid the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression.”56 Given the sheer volume 
of the credit-default-swap market57 and the dangers that exposure to it 
caused major financial institutions and our economy as a whole, an 
obvious question arises: Where were the regulations and regulators 
that “protect investors, maintain orderly markets and promote 
financial stability”?58 
                                                                                                                    
51 Blumberg, supra note 25; see also Vasudev, supra note 22, at 775 (“AIG . . . estimated 
the subprime component in its default swap basket at $61.4 billion. But the assistance provided 
by the federal government since September 2008 is reported to be over $170 billion. This 
indicates that the loss in default swaps business went beyond the subprime exposure estimated 
by AIG.”) (citation omitted); George Soros, One Way to Stop Bear Raids: Credit Default Swaps 
Need Much Stricter Regulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2009, at A17 (“AIG failed because it sold 
large amounts of credit default swaps (CDS) without properly offsetting or covering their 
positions.”). 
52 Sara Lepro, Wells Fargo Buys Wachovia for $15.1 Billion, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/SmartHome/story?id=5946486&page=1. 
53 John Carney, Wells Fargo’s Ticking Time Bomb: Credit Default Swaps On Commercial 
Mortgages, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sep. 17, 2009, 1:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/john-
carney-wells-fargos-ticking-time-bomb-credit-default-swaps-on-commercial-mortgages-2009-9.  
54 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 48.  
55 Shannon D. Harrington & Christine Harper, Wall Street Shrinks from Credit Default 
Swaps Before Rules Hit, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-29/wall-street-shrinks-from-default-swaps-as-dodd-
frank-rules-hit-speculators.html. 
56 Id.; see also Morrissey, supra note 49 (“[T]he top 25 banks [held] more than $13 
trillion in credit default swaps . . . at the end of the third quarter of 2007 . . . . JP Morgan Chase, 
Citibank, Bank of America and Wachovia were ranked among the top four most active . . . .”). 
57 $62.2 trillion is more than four times the annual gross domestic product of the United 
States. World Factbook: United States, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (click on “Economy :: UNITED STATES”) 
(estimating that the United States’ gross domestic product for 2010 would be $14.82 trillion).  
58 Financial Regulation, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON (last visited Mar.. 30, 2012), 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=financial-regulation. 
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D. Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of Credit Default Swap 
Despite their similarity to insurance, the law did not regulate credit 
default swaps prior to Dodd-Frank to the same extent that it regulates 
the traditional insurance industry.59 For instance, state law often 
mandates that insurance providers disclose financial information,60 
allow regulators and shareholders to inspect their “books and 
records,”61 and “require an insurer to maintain a specified amount of 
capital or surplus or reserves to meet liabilities.”62 In contrast, prior to 
Dodd-Frank, credit default swaps and the credit-default-swap market 
were generally unregulated.63 Indeed, the federal rules governing 
credit default swaps were “the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.”64 The lack of regulation meant that participants in the 
credit-default-swap market traded the instrument in an “over-the-
                                                                                                                   
59 See State of New York Insurance Department, Office of General Counsel, Funding 
Agreement Securitizations (Apr. 18, 2000) 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2000/rg004181.htm (the State of New York deciding not 
to consider credit default swaps as insurance contracts). But see State of New York Insurance 
Department, “Best practices” for Financial Guaranty Insurers, Circular Letter No. 19 (Sept. 22, 
2008), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2008/cl08_19.htm (reversing this policy). 
For an explanation of why credit default swaps are not treated like insurance, see Credit 
Default Swap Regulation Overview, KRAMER LEVIN (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/Publication/8c676a8c-c444-4091-827b-
008b78feaa15/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f31d02c5-7ce3-4ea6-9fa7-
02b2ac07d509/5361_Alert_CDSwaps_v7.pdf (“The conclusion that [credit default swaps] are 
not insurance contracts is based upon the fact that the buyer of credit protection under a [credit 
default swap] need not suffer any loss nor provide any evidence of any loss with respect to the 
relevant reference entity or obligation to receive payment from seller.”).  
60 1 COUCH ON INS. § 2:24 (3d ed. 2009) (“In order to facilitate governmental control of 
insurers, and in some instances to make information available to the stockholders, members, or 
policyholders of insurers, or to the public at large, statutes provide for the filing of specified 
information with a government officer or commission. Such information may consist of a 
classification of risks and premium rates, policy forms, annual business transaction reports, or 
current financial condition. Statutes may require the publication of annual statements in daily 
papers designated by the insurance commissioners, making reports to the comptroller, or for 
returns to the insurance commissioner.”) (citations omitted). 
61 Id. § 2:25. 
62 Id. § 2:27. 
63 Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, United States Secretary of the Treasury, to Harry 
Reid, United States Senator (May 13, 2009), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/OTCletter20090513.pdf (writing that the 
credit-default-swap market, among others, before Dodd Frank “[were] largely excluded or 
exempted from regulation”); see also Dutt, supra note 32, at 186 (“The current state of CDS 
market regulation in the United States is quite limited.”).  
64 KRAMER LEVIN, supra note 59, at 1; see also Kramer, Harris, & Ansehl, supra note 49 
at 26 (“As a result of the [Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000], [credit default 
swaps] and other [over-the-counter] derivative contracts [were] not subject to any federal 
regulation.”).  
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counter”65 fashion, where “participants . . . transacted . . . bilaterally 
without the facilitation of an exchange.”66  
The use of an over-the-counter market and the non-regulation of 
credit default swaps in general created economic problems. First, the 
presence of an exchange forces “buyers and sellers [to] choose from 
standardized listed products, and [ensures that] counterparties rarely 
interact directly, relying instead on the exchange to facilitate contract 
settlement.”67 Without the stabilizing force an exchange provides, 
traders in the credit-default-swap market “independently negotiate[d] 
terms and settle[d] contracts,”68 which exposed those parties to the 
risk of “less transparency than [they would otherwise have in] 
exchange-based markets.”69 As a result, there were “complicat[ions] 
in risk management and regulation of [over-the-counter] products.” 70  
A lack of transparency caused uncertainty within the market 
because participants were unaware of the maneuvers, positions, or 
relative stability of their counterparts,71 which led to a second 
problem: the fact that market participants were counterparties to each 
other “creat[ed] a daisy chain of systemic risk throughout the 
financial system.”72 This was troublesome because “market 
participants [were] unable to discern how much contingent exposure 
their counterparties ha[d] to other market participants.”73 Because the 
counterparties in the pre-2008 over-the-counter market were 
predominately major institutions—e.g., AIG, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, 
Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns—systemic risk was high.74  
                                                                                                                    
65 Kress, supra note 23, at 54; see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 195 (“In the years 
leading to the financial crisis, credit default swap agreements traded in the OTC market . . . .”).  
66 Kress, supra note 23, at 54; see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 195 (writing that, in the 
over-the-counter market, “counterparties engage[] directly, transacting with one another without 
the services or public disclosures involved in trading securities on an exchange or other formal 
trading platform”).  
67 Kress, supra note 23, at 54; see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 196 (“[Over-the-
counter] markets historically lacked . . . regulatory oversight.”). 
68 Kress, supra note 23, at 54. 
69 Id. at 54–55.  
70 Id. at 55.   
71 Johnson, supra note 34, at 196 (quoting Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n: The Role of 
Derivatives in the Financial Crisis 3 (July 1, 2010) (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0701-Gensler.pdf) (“[T]he lack of 
transparency in the OTC market resulted in market participants being ‘unable to adequately 
judge the risks they were assuming.’”).  
72 William Spencer Topham, Re-Regulating “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and Future Derivative 
Regulation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 137 (2010).  
73 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 243 (2009) (citations omitted).  
74 Even after the brunt of the financial crisis passed, a small number of firms continue to 
dominate the credit-default-swap market. David M. Katz, Five Firms Hold 80% of Derivatives 
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As such, some commentators called for Congress to completely 
ban market participants’ ability to purchase credit default swaps 
without having an interest in the debt instrument underlying the 
swap.75 While Congress chose not to transform the market in such a 
stark way,76 “[Dodd-Frank] will drastically change the regulation of 
trading of derivatives instruments in the United States”77 because it 
made substantial modifications to the regulatory treatment of the 
credit-default-swap market.78 
Dodd-Frank’s specific section dealing with credit default swaps 
and other derivatives, is entitled “Prohibition against Federal 
Government bailouts of swaps entities,”79 which suggests that 
Congress recognized derivatives’ injurious effects over the past few 
years. Dodd-Frank takes the previously unregulated market for credit 
default swaps and grants two bodies—the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission—
regulatory powers over the instrument.80 And “[p]robably the most 
significant change made by [Dodd-Frank]” is the requirement that 
credit-default-swap contracts be “traded on an exchange (or swap-
execution facility) and cleared by a clearing organization.”81 Further, 
                                                                                                                   
 
Risk, Fitch Report Finds, CFO.COM (July 24, 2009), 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14113089/?f=rsspage (“About 80% of the derivative assets and 
liabilities carried on the balance sheets of 100 companies reviewed by Fitch were held by five 
banks: JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley. 
Those five banks also account for more than 96% of the companies' exposure to credit 
derivatives.”). 
75 See, e.g., Soros, supra note 51 (“Only those who own the underlying bonds ought to be 
allowed to buy them.”); Rolfe Winkler, Credit Default Swaps Should Be Regulated As 
Insurance, MYNEWMARKETS.COM (Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://www.mynewmarkets.com/articles/102605/credit-default-swaps-should-be-regulated-as-
insurance (suggesting the government “[r]egulate [credit default swaps] as insurance”); Smith, 
supra note 18 (“[C]entral clearing and/or putting [credit default swaps] on exchanges are 
inadequate remedies.”). 
76 See Lawrence D. Hui & Mary Kuan, Legal Update: Impact of Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act on Derivatives Trading, KLEINBERG, KAPLAN, WOLFF & 
COHEN, 6 (Aug. 2010), http://www.kkwc.com/library_cat/uf_Impact_of_Dodd-
Frank_Wall_St__Reform.pdf (“The Dodd-Frank Act . . . provid[es] that states may not regulate 
swaps as insurance.”). 
77 Id. at 1; see also Eileen Bannon & Yoo-Keyong Kwon, Derivatives Regulation Under 
Dodd-Frank: Potential Implications for Insurance Products and Companies, DEWEY & 
LEBOEUF, 1 (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/~/media/Files/attorneyarticles/2011/20110317_DerivativesRegul
ation.ashx (“Title VII of [Dodd-Frank] accomplishes a sweeping reform of the previously 
largely unregulated derivatives market.”).  
78 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 
§§ 721–54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1754 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 & 15 U.S.C.). 
79 § 716, 124 Stat. at 1648. 
80 Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 2.  
81 Id. at 3; see also Kress, supra note 23, at 61 (“[Dodd Frank] calls for [credit default 
swaps] to be traded through centralized counterparties, or clearinghouses.”); Daniel Waldman & 
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“dealers” of credit default swaps will now be subject to 
“comprehensive registration requirements, as well as capital and 
margin requirements, and rules governing business conduct and 
record keeping.”82 Finally, “[d]ealers that are banks will be subject to 
capital and margin requirements set by their banking regulators.”83 
These rules addressed numerous areas of concern regarding the 
credit-default-swap market. First, by placing credit default swaps into 
exchanges, “[c]ounterparty risk is [now] diffused through [the] central 
clearinghouse.”84 Essentially, the “[central clearinghouse] acts as a 
middleman: the original, bilateral contract is replaced by two separate 
contracts, one each between the original parties and the 
[clearinghouse].”85 This brings forth “[t]he potential benefit[] . . . [of] 
transparency and much lower transaction costs,”86 because 
participants on both sides of trades will have a better understanding of 
the prices of similar contracts and the types of different contracts 
made by other market participants.87  
Second, “the clearing corporation essentially guarantees the 
derivatives contracts for each side of the trade and requires all of its 
members to post sufficient margin so as to safeguard the clearing of 
the trades,”88 which is vital because, as some commentators contend, 
“[t]he most critical role for regulation is to make sure that the sellers 
of risk have the capital to support their bets.”89 Ultimately, 
clearinghouses “reduce systemic risk by netting offsetting exposures 
and mutualizing counterparty risk among all of their members.”90  
                                                                                                                    
 
Ahmad Hajj, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to Significantly 
Impact Derivatives Trading of Banks, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, 1 (July 2010), 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory--Dodd-
Frank%20Wall%20Street%20Reform%20and%20Consumer%20Protection%20Act_071410.pdf 
(“Participants in derivatives trades could also be required to clear many or all of their swaps 
through a central clearing house.”). 
82 Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 4–5; see also Waldman & Hajj, supra note 81, at 1 
(“Banks that fit within the Act’s definition of ‘swap dealer’ or ‘major swap participant’ (MSP) 
would be subject to new requirements that could include: registration, capital and margin, 
reporting and record-keeping, as well as new business conduct standards.”).  
83 Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 5.   
84 Id. at 3.   
85 Kress, supra note 23, at 61.  
86 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 48.  
87 See Dutt, supra note 32, at 195 (“A centralized clearinghouse for [credit default swaps] 
transactions would reduce counterparty and systemic risks and increase market transparency and 
liquidity.”). 
88 See Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 3.   
89 Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 28, at WK10. 
90 Kress, supra note 23, at 61; see also Dutt, supra note 32, at 195 (“The clearinghouse 
will reduce counterparty risk by becoming the counterparty to every [credit-default-swap] 
transaction.”). 
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These regulations, however, do not address all of the problems 
credit default swaps create. Namely, these regulations fail to prevent 
unnecessary bankruptcies brought on by credit default swaps, which 
is the focus of this Comment.  
II. EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME: HOW AND WHY CREDIT-DEFAULT-
SWAP HOLDERS CAUSE UNNECESSARY BANKRUPTCIES  
Despite taking important steps to reduce the systemic risk that 
credit default swaps cause, Dodd-Frank did not address an important 
risk that credit default swaps create: the potential that swap holders 
“may prefer to force [a] company into bankruptcy, rather than agree 
to a restructuring, because the bankruptcy filing will trigger a 
contractual payoff.”91 Although this may seem counterintuitive, a 
simple illustration shows how this works in theory.  
Remember that Investor L owns Company X’s bonds and that she 
also purchased a credit default swap to hedge against the possibility 
that X would be unable to fulfill its obligations on those bonds. Next, 
assume that X is teetering on the edge of bankruptcy and hopes to 
restructure its debt to ensure that it can continue to operate. This 
restructuring, however, would require L to accept less than the full 
amount that X owes her from the bonds. In this scenario, L may 
prefer to receive the payout from her credit default swap rather than 
agree to the restructuring, a preference that could force X into 
bankruptcy.92 Indeed, if L is a rational actor, she will prefer X to fail. 
Moreover, if L is acting on behalf of other investors—if she manages 
a hedge fund, for instance—she may have a fiduciary obligation to 
                                                                                                                   
91 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: 
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 732 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, 
Empty Voting II]; see also Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 
81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 427 (2007) (“[C]redit derivatives may ultimately discourage out-of-
court restructurings . . . .”); cf. Johnson, supra note 34, at 209 (citation omitted) (“Credit default 
swaps allow market participants to share the risk of a borrower's default. Therefore, when a 
lender purchases a credit default swap to offset its exposure if the reference entity defaults, the 
lender may have diminished incentives to assist the issuer of the debt that is the underlying asset 
in the credit default swap agreement.”). 
92 Professors Hu and Black use the following example: “Suppose, for example, that a 
hedge fund, bank, or other investor holds $200 million of a company’s bonds, but is also long a 
$500 million notional amount in credit default swaps on this debt.” Hu & Black, Empty Voting 
II, supra note 91, at 731–32. It is also important to note that, even if Investor L had purchased 
the same amount of protection against default that he was owed under the bond payment, or 
even somewhat less, L might still prefer bankruptcy because of the inherent costs involved in 
bankruptcy proceedings. Cf. Caroline Salas & Shannon D. Harrington, Darth Wall Street 
Thwarting Debtors with Credit Default Swaps, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2009, 1:03 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZjMcuIoat7U&refer=home 
(“‘Say you’ve lent $100 million to a company and you had bought $100 million in credit-default 
swaps,’ said Henry Hu, a law professor at the University of Texas in Austin. ‘In that 
circumstance, the creditor really doesn’t care whether or not the company goes under.’”). 
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prefer X’s bankruptcy.93 This phenomenon—“where a lender who has 
bought protection on an underlying loan, bond or credit exposure may 
have an incentive to put the reference entity into bankruptcy or 
Chapter 11”94—is called “empty creditor syndrome.”95  
Empty creditor syndrome begins with the understanding that “a 
traditional conception of debt ownership includes a standard package 
of economic rights (principally principal and interest payments), 
control rights, default rights, and other rights and obligations under 
contractual covenants, federal bankruptcy law, and, to a limited 
extent, state corporate law.”96 When a creditor purchases a credit 
default swap providing a payout if the company he invests in defaults 
on its obligation, the creditor hedges its risk in the original debt 
transaction.97 Despite this hedge, the creditor retains full voting rights 
in bankruptcy. As one commentator notes: 
A creditor who has partly or fully hedged through a credit 
default swap nevertheless retains full contractual rights under 
the loan agreement or bond indenture, and full voting rights 
in bankruptcy. In contrast, the holder of the long side of the 
credit default swap bears default risk, but has no control 
rights.98  
Because creditors who hold credit default swaps on the debt they 
have provided are not saddled with the same economic concerns as 
other individuals or entities who share that control, they may have 
“incentives to vote against the interests of other shareholders.”99 
                                                                                                                    
93 This assumes the companies only duty is to maximize return to its investors.  
94 Satyajit Das, Credit Default Swaps—Financial Innovation or Financial Dysfunction?, 
BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV., July 2010, at 45, 50, available at 
http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financier
e/etude06_rsf_1007.pdf. 
95 Id.; see also Henry T.C. Hu, Op-Ed., ‘Empty Creditors’ and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 10, 2009, at A13 (“Thus the ‘empty creditor’: someone (or institution) who may have the 
contractual control but, by simultaneously holding credit default swaps, little or no economic 
exposure if the debt goes bad. Indeed, if a creditor holds enough credit default swaps, he may 
simultaneously have control rights and incentives to cause the debtor firm’s value to fall. And if 
bankruptcy occurs, the empty creditor may undermine proper reorganization, especially if his 
interests (or non-interests) are not fully disclosed to the bankruptcy court.”). 
96 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 91, at 728.  
97 See id. (“One simple way for a creditor to hedge involves a credit default swap.”).  
98 Id. at 730–31; see also Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: 
An Overview, M & A LAWYER, Aug. 2008 at 1 (confirming the decoupling of rights of the 
creditors debtors in relationship to credit default swaps) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Debt and 
Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview]. 
99 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II ,supra note 91, at 731.  
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Importantly, these “creditor[s] might prefer that the company fail, and 
hence oppose an out-of-court restructuring.”100 
Unfortunately, empty creditor syndrome is not simply a theoretical 
problem.101 Take, for example, Six Flags’ bankruptcy in 2009.102 
Roughly, one month prior to filing, Six Flags attempted to stave off 
financial ruin with a “debt-for-equity exchange” offer that would have 
allowed bondholders to exchange their debt for an equity position in 
the company.103 To complete the deal, Six Flags required that “95% 
of its outstanding [debt holders] participate[]” in the exchange.104 For 
the majority of Six Flags’ bondholders, this deal made sense, as their 
investments would lose considerable value if the company filed for 
bankruptcy.105 Indeed, “most bondholders favored” Six Flags’ 
offer.106  
The same may not have been true, however, for one of the 
company’s major bondholders: Fidelity Investments. Fidelity “had 
bought credit default swaps to insure itself against the possibility that 
[Six Flags] would file for bankruptcy.”107 Additionally, Fidelity’s 
debt holdings constituted a “blocking stake,” meaning that, if “[it] 
refused to participate in the exchange, Six Flags had no legal remedy 
except to reduce the participation threshold or to file for 
bankruptcy.”108 Within one month of its debt-for-equity offer, Six 
Flags failed to garner enough bondholder support for the 
restructuring, and the company filed for Chapter 11 protection.109  
                                                                                                                    
100 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance 
and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EURO. FIN. MAN. 663, 682 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, 
Governance and Systemic Risk].   
101 George Washington, Guest Post: Credit Default Swaps—Love ‘Em, Ban ‘Em, or Tax 
‘Em?, NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 30, 2009, 1:06 AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/ 
09/guest-post-credit-default-swaps-love-em-ban-em-or-tax-em.html (“And don’t forget that 
credit default swap counterparties drive company after company into bankruptcy, and that—
once a company the counterparties aare [sic] betting against goes bankrupt—the counterparties 
cut in line in front of all of the bankruptcy creditors to get paid.”). 
102 Michael J. De La Merced, Six Flags Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y TIMES (June 13, 2009, 
11:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/six-flags-files-for-bankruptcy/. 
103 Daniel Hemel, Comment, Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 
159, 159 (2010).   
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 159–160. 
106 Id. at 160.  
107 Id. (citing Michael S. Rosenwald, Plagued by Debt, Six Flags Faces Its Own Wild Ride, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2009, at A10). 
108 Id. at 163 (citation omitted). 
109 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 209 (“[S]ome posit that the recent bankruptcies at 
automakers General Motors Company and Chrysler LLC demonstrate the need to evaluate 
carefully traditional assumptions about creditors’ intentions and presumed responses to a 
distressed debtor.”); Hemel, supra note 103, at 161 (citing Tom Krisher, Chrysler Debtholder 
Talks Pick Up Pace; GM Stalled, ABC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=7332901 and Loren Steffy, Credit-Default 
Swaps: Banking on Bankruptcy, HOUSTON CHRON., July 22, 2009, at 1).   
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Importantly, Six Flags’ bankruptcy is not an isolated incident. 
Indeed, a number of bankruptcies during the past few years have 
involved empty creditors.110 For instance, commentators have pointed 
to the “corporate bankruptcies of Canadian newsprint producer 
AbitibiBowater Inc. and U.S. shopping center developer General 
Growth Properties Inc.” as instances where “credit default swaps 
became an actual bankruptcy catalyst.”111 Others believe that credit-
default-swap holders drove General Motors Co.’s and Chrysler LLC’s 
bankruptcies.112 Likewise, creditors may have pushed LyondellBasell 
Industries, a chemical company traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange that filed for bankruptcy in 2009,113 toward failure.114 And, 
although neither situation ended in bankruptcy, some contend that 
“Ford Motor Co. [was being] pushed toward bankruptcy by 
bondholders trying to profit from credit default swaps that protect 
against losses on their high-yield debt,”115 while others believe that 
“YRC Worldwide . . . , one of the largest trucking companies in the 
United States,” faced the same pressure.116 Likewise, some argue that, 
in the time leading up to the federal bailout, “Goldman Sachs was . . . 
an empty creditor of AIG.”117 
As both theory and practice show, parties in the credit-default-
swap market may have incentives that run counter to those of other 
creditors118 and, more importantly, to those of the broader 
                                                                                                                    
110 Samuel M. Kidder, Comment, What’s Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy 
Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace with Financial Innovation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 803, 807 (2011) 
(“There is anecdotal evidence of net short [sic] creditors refusing to participate in out-of-court 
workout agreements . . .”). 
111 Martin Hutchinson, Ban Credit Default Swaps? These Corporate Bankruptcies Show 
We Should, CONTRARIAN PROFITS (Apr. 23, 2009), 
http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/ban-credit-default-swaps-these-corporate-
bankruptcies-show-we-should/15849.  
112 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 159–161. With respect to General Motors in particular, 
see Daniel Gross, Why GM Might Go Bankrupt, SLATE (May 12, 2009, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2009/05/why_gm_may_go_bankrupt.html. 
113 Ana Campoy & Marie Beaudette, Lyondell’s U.S. Arm in Chapter 11: Dutch Chemical 
Maker Struggled With Heavy Debt from 2007 Acquisition, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2009, 7:45 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123127968554958711.html.  
114 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 160–161. 
115 Salas & Harrington, supra note 92.   
116 See Kidder, supra note 110, at 808–809. 
117 Hu, ‘Empty Creditors’ and the Crisis, supra note 95. 
118 Norris, supra note 40 (“There is another, little noticed, possible impact of credit-default 
swaps. They can undermine bankruptcy laws. Normally, a creditor wants to keep a company out 
of bankruptcy if there is a decent chance it can survive. If it does go broke, the creditor wants to 
maximize the value of the company anyway, so that more will be available to pay creditors. But 
what happens if a major creditor, who might even control one class of bonds, has a much larger 
position in credit-default swaps? Will he not have interests directly at odds with those of other 
creditors, since he will do better if the company ends up with less to pay its creditors? Might 
that creditor seek to, and perhaps be able to, sabotage the company’s best hopes for revival?”). 
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economy.119 “The toll that business failure exacts on dependent 
constituencies goes beyond job loss and creditor recovery statistics. 
The closing of a failed business may produce shock waves that 
reverberate throughout the local, regional or national economy.”120 
Given the United States’ recent emergence from a long-lasting 
recession, the negative effects of bankruptcies on the economy at 
large,121 and the trillions of dollars of credit default swaps currently in 
circulation,122 Congress should address empty creditor syndrome as it 
relates to failed restructurings and premature bankruptcies.123 
III. COMBATTING EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME 
Ultimately, “the lifeblood of corporate reorganizations is and 
always has been negotiation. Creating the optimal environment for 
facilitating such negotiation is the principal business of those who 
shape the law.”124 Perhaps in recognition of this general principle, 
typical “financial covenants, especially in bank loan agreements, are 
often written fairly strictly, to provide an early warning of financial 
trouble and an opportunity for renegotiation.”125 Because of credit 
default swaps, however, the tendency to favor negotiation of debt 
terms when a debtor is facing temporary financial stress may be 
dissipating.126 Indeed, if Investor L is better off having Company X 
bankrupt (regardless of whether X can recover from its difficult 
financial position in the future) and L has the chance to ensure that X 
will indeed go bankrupt, why would L even consider sitting down at 
the negotiating table to discuss a restructuring?  
                                                                                                                   
119 Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial 
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 75 (1995) (“Business failure negatively affects a broad range of 
interests.”). 
120 Id. at 76. 
121 Id.; see also Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 690–693 
(discussing that empty creditors are also a source of systemic risk for the economy at large.). 
122 Lewis and Einhorn, supra note 28 (“There are [still] tens of trillions of dollars in 
[credit-default-swap] contracts between big financial firms.”); Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Time 
for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at BU2 (“[T]he Bank for 
International Settlements, [found that] credit default swaps with a face value of $36 trillion were 
outstanding in the second quarter of 2009.”). 
123 Although outside the scope of this Comment, future research may consider how 
creditors’ ability to institute bankruptcy proceedings relates to empty creditor syndrome. See 
Lubben, supra note 91, at 427 (“Creditors will have every incentive to trigger the swap by filing 
an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor, illustrating the important point that 
‘bankruptcy’ is the one credit event that can be controlled by credit buyers.”); see also Hemel, 
supra note 103, at 164 (citing Lubben for the same proposition).    
124 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 699. 
125 Hu & Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview, supra note 98, at 8. 
126 See supra Part II (discussing stresses on creditors).  
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A few commentators have discussed this issue. In particular, one 
commentator’s proposal offers a clever starting point for addressing 
the specific problem this Comment focuses on: preventing credit-
default-swap holders from forcing companies into bankruptcy by 
refusing to engage in restructuring negotiations.127 To truly combat 
this phenomenon, however, Congress should take a stronger stand.  
A. Other Commentators’ Consideration of Empty Creditor Syndrome 
To date, legal academics have paid little attention to the 
relationship between empty creditor syndrome and corporate 
bankruptcies.128 The majority of those who have commented on this 
issue have focused on how credit-default-swap holders affect 
companies after those companies have already filed for bankruptcy.129 
Their regulatory recommendations address the post-bankruptcy 
environment and encourage the disclosure of credit-default-swap 
positions.130 For instance, one commentator calls for bankruptcy law 
to “require any party seeking to be heard in [a bankruptcy] case to file 
an accompanying verified statement setting forth its disclosable 
economic interests,” including credit default swaps, under Rule 2019 
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.131 Another calls for 
“[t]he Bankruptcy Code” to generally “incorporate a system that 
mandates disclosures of short positions in the debtor’s equity or debt, 
derivatives or other third party contracts that reduce or eliminate an 
investor’s economic risk, as well as interest in major competitors of 
the debtor.”132  
Similarly, law professors Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, who 
have written extensively on empty creditor syndrome, argue that 
disclosure “should become a routine part of bankruptcy 
proceedings.”133 Additionally, Professors Hu and Black add to the 
general call for more disclosure by asserting that: 
                                                                                                                    
127 See generally Hemel, supra note 103. 
128 Kidder, supra note 110, at 805 (“As the credit derivatives market is a relatively recent 
and complex phenomenon, its potential implications in the bankruptcy context have received 
only limited scholarly attention.”). 
129 See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 91 (discussing, generally, how credit default swaps can 
impact reorganizations).   
130 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 164–67 (surveying previous scholarly solutions to the 
empty creditor problem).   
131 Kidder, supra note 110, at 839. 
132 Kevin J. Coco, Note, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and 
Ownership Disclosure in Chapter 11 Cases, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 610, 649 (2008); see 
also Lubben, supra note 91, at 427 (proclaiming that more disclosure may be necessary to 
prevent the negative effects).   
133 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 91, at 734; see also Hu & Black, Governance 
and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 684 (arguing for the same).   
2012] EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME AND VIVISEPULTURE 1305 
Debt contracts may need to adjust to the new world of hedged 
interests, voting rights in bankruptcy may need to be based on 
net economic ownership instead of gross ownership of debt, 
and the extra complexities in devising sensible voting rules 
may provide support for proposals to rely more on 
auctions.134  
While Congress’s adoption of these proposals may improve the 
efficiency of Chapter 11—a laudable goal in its own right135—
“[c]redit default swaps create a moral hazard problem [both] before 
the Chapter 11 begins and in its immediate aftermath.”136 Thus, to 
adopt truly meaningful regulatory change, Congress must address the 
pre-bankruptcy effects empty creditor syndrome has on companies.  
One commentator, Daniel Hemel, has written on this specific 
issue.137 To begin, Hemel notes that disclosure requirements, such as 
those that advocates of post-bankruptcy reform propose, “would not 
necessarily alter the incentives ‘empty creditors’ in pre-bankruptcy 
restructuring situations.”138 Second, he contends that, by changing the 
language that credit-default-swap agreements typically use, we can 
accomplish the goal of altering these incentives to preclude credit-
default-swap holders from causing unnecessary bankruptcies.139 
Currently, “[t]he International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), a private sector trade association, has crafted a Master 
Agreement that governs most credit default swap[s].”140 Hemel 
proposes that the ISDA Master Agreement include “a broad definition 
of ‘restructuring’” as one of the events that compels a seller of credit 
default swaps to pay purchasers.141 Under Hemel’s proposed 
language, a restructuring would require credit-default-swap sellers to 
pay the swapholder the difference between the face value of the 
holder’s stake in the asset being restructured and the value in what the 
holder owns after the restructuring.142 Currently, restructurings, such 
                                                                                                                   
134 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 91, at 735; see also Hu & Black, Governance 
and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 684 (arguing for the same).   
135 After all, “[v]oting by empty creditors in bankruptcy can lead to less efficient decisions 
on liquidation versus continuation, or on post-reorganisation capital structures.” Hu & Black, 
Governance and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 684.   
136 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 683. 
137 Hemel, supra note 103. 
138 Id. at 165 (citing Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 683).   
139 Id. at 161. 
140 Id. at 162.  
141 Id. at 167. 
142 Id. at 168. 
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as debt exchanges, do not fall under credit-default-swaps standard 
language for default, as found in the ISDA Master Agreement.143  
If future participants in the credit-default-swap market make the 
contractual changes that Hemel proposes, it is clear that the 
agreements will remove the incentive for credit-default-swap holders 
to force companies into bankruptcy by refusing to negotiate during 
restructurings.144 Consider our old friends Investor L, Company X, 
and Insurance Firm Z. Initially, Z sold L a credit default swap 
insuring L’s investment in X’s bonds. Now assume that the agreement 
between L and Z also requires Z to pay L if X restructures its debt-
equity ratio. What if X, on the verge of bankruptcy, offers its 
debtholders a debt-for-equity exchange to strengthen itself moving 
forward?  
Presumably, the present market value of the equity that Investor L 
and Company X’s other bondholders would receive will be less than 
the face value of the bonds they own. For example, assume that L’s 
bonds have an aggregate face value of $1,000,000, but, if she accepts 
X’s proposed exchange, her equity stake will be worth only $500,000. 
Under the old credit-default-swap agreements, L would rather receive 
the $1,000,000 payout from Insurance Firm Z than stock worth 
$500,000. But, under the new terms that Hemel proposes, L is 
indifferent. If L accepts X’s restructuring offer, Z must pay her 
$500,000—the difference between the $1,000,000 face value of the 
bonds and the $500,000 present market value of the equity stake in X. 
After Z’s payment and X’s restructuring, L will have $500,000 in 
cash and a $500,000 equity stake in X. Thus, L ends up with the same 
amount of value she would have had if X went bankrupt. At the point 
when L had to decide whether to participate in the restructuring, she 
no longer had an incentive to force the company into bankruptcy.145  
B. Congress Should Ensure That Credit-Default-Swap Contracts 
Remove the Incentive for Credit-Default-Swap Holders to Force 
Companies into Early Bankruptcies 
Hemel’s proposed change to the contractual language that parties 
use in the credit-default-swap market accomplishes the goal of 
preventing credit-default-swap holders from forcing companies into 
bankruptcy by removing the holders’ incentives to do so. But, to 
                                                                                                                    
143 Id. at 162 (citing Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How 
to Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 791 
(2008)). 
144 Id. at 167–69 (outlining his proposed changes). 
145 See id. at 167–68 (exploring another hypothetical to explain this point).   
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accomplish this, Hemel called for the “[ISDA], a private sector trade 
association,”146 to change the definition of default in its standard 
credit-default-swap agreement voluntarily.147 The effectiveness of his 
proposal, therefore, relies on two uncertain contingencies.  
First, the ISDA must voluntarily make the change that Hemel 
proposes to its Master Agreement. This seems unlikely given the 
ISDA’s response to a lawsuit that turned on whether, under the ISDA 
Master Agreement, a company’s restructuring constituted a credit 
event requiring the credit-default-swap issuer to pay the purchaser.148 
During the case, the “ISDA issued a new set of credit derivatives 
definitions” that established that “a ‘voluntary debt exchange [would] 
not trigger a credit event.’”149 Additionally, when “the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision . . . considered a rule that would 
recognize credit default swaps for regulatory capital purposes only if 
the swaps specified ‘restructuring’ as a credit event[,] . . . ISDA 
raised concerns . . . .”150   
Even if the ISDA changes course and voluntarily makes this 
change, a second contingency comes into play: will the parties to 
credit default swaps continue to utilize the ISDA Master Agreement 
without amending the new definition of credit event? It seems 
unlikely that they will. By adding “restructurings” to the list of events 
that trigger the credit-default-swap seller’s obligation to pay, the 
holder increases the overall number of ways that a seller may have to 
make payment. Thus, by including “restructuring,” the purchaser has 
increased the likelihood that the seller will be required to make 
payment on the swap. If a seller recognizes that he is more likely to 
have to make payment later, he will charge more for the swap 
upfront.  
Some might argue that sellers could begin requiring this language 
as a prerequisite for even being willing to offer credit default swaps. 
This makes sense at first (consider that Insurance Firm Z is better off 
paying $500,000 rather than $1,000,000). As AIG’s actions leading 
up to our recent financial crisis show, however, credit-default-swap 
sellers may not be that prudent.151 Or, in a more likely scenario, 
sellers have simply balanced the value of being able to offer a cheaper 
product against the probability that it will result in more costly 
                                                                                                                    
146 Hemel, supra note 103, at 162. 
147 Id. at 167–68. 
148 Id. at 162 (citing Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., No. 02 
Civ. 1312, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002)). 
149 Id. (citing Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How To 
Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 791 (2008)). 
150 Id. at 166. 
151 See supra Part I.B–C. 
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payouts and determined that offering credit default swaps without 
including this language is advantageous to them. This implies that the 
current issuers of credit default swaps are miscalculating the risks 
involved to them with empty creditor syndrome (higher than 
necessary payouts). After all, it is likely that credit-default-swap 
sellers have probably considered these scenarios before this 
Comment, and yet they have not required this language in their 
offerings. It is not surprising, though, given their inability to 
accurately evaluate risk in the past.152  
Knowing this, purchasers are also unlikely to demand this change. 
After all, why would purchasers voluntarily demand language that 
increases their contracts’ cost? They would not, especially when one 
realizes that they are indifferent between the protection offered by the 
old language and the new language. Indeed, Investor L, as a rational 
actor, should not care whether she receives $1,000,000 cash or 
$500,000 in cash and $500,000 worth of equity in Company X.153 L, 
therefore, will not pay more to receive the latter by requiring that the 
credit-default-swap agreement include restructuring as a triggering 
event. 
Admittedly, the uncertainty of this second contingency could be 
eliminated if the parties are forced to include this language. Hemel 
addresses this question by pointing to the fact that, because credit 
default swaps will be “mov[ing] toward a clearinghouse system,”154 
under Dodd-Frank,155 “opportunities to construct customized 
contracts will diminish.”156 This is true, Hemel contends, because 
clearinghouses may require that credit-default-swap agreements 
follow the ISDA Master Agreement.157 At present, however, Dodd-
Frank and the SEC’s subsequent rules have not required 
clearinghouses to compel market participants to use the ISDA Master 
Agreement.158  
                                                                                                                    
152 See supra Part I.B–C. 
153 The value of the equity is, after all, a cash equivalent.  
154 Hemel, supra note 103, at 169. 
155 See supra Part I.D.  
156 Hemel, supra note 103, at 169.   
157 See id. (“The one clearinghouse that is up-and-running in the United States, ICE Trust, 
applies the ISDA Master Agreement—with a small number of exceptions—to all swaps that it 
clears.”). 
158 Dodd-Frank makes no mention of the ISDA, let alone mandating that clearinghouses 
require market participants follow its Master Agreement. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(making no mention of the ISDA). Likewise, the SEC, which has regulatory power over 
“security-based swap agreements, such as credit default swaps,” has not addressed the issue.  
See Derivatives, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (outlining and linking to the rule 
proposals the SEC has made “[a]s of the end of 2011”) (quotations omitted).   
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Furthermore, even if the credit-default-swap market entirely 
moves to clearinghouses, it is counterintuitive to assume that all 
clearinghouses will require this definition in every credit-default-
swap agreement. Although “[t]he one clearinghouse that is up-and-
running in the United States, ICE Trust, applies the ISDA Master 
Agreement—with a small number of exceptions—to all swaps that it 
clears,”159 it is highly probable that more clearinghouses will emerge 
as the whole credit-default-swap market moves to clearinghouses. 
And new clearinghouses may be unlikely to compel parties to abide 
by the ISDA Master Agreement. After all, a clearinghouse is simply 
interested in ensuring that the purchasers of the swaps make the 
required payments and, when an event that triggers an obligation for a 
seller to make a payout, the seller does so.160 Adding to the kinds of 
events that can trigger such an obligation for the seller may 
complicate this role because it introduces another type of event, the 
occurrence of which the parties may disagree about. Even if some 
clearinghouses do require that restructurings count as a triggering 
event, it is unlikely that all will because demand probably exists for 
the parties to develop their credit-default-swap contracts freely as 
they have been in the over-the-counter market.  
Despite the analysis above, there remains another way that 
Congress could ensure that the parties adopt the changes that Hemel 
proposes: it could mandate that parties engaging in credit default 
swaps do so. Unfortunately, this will be politically challenging. 
Should the federal government be mandating specific contractual 
terms? Even if it theoretically should, will politicians have the 
political will to do so? If the political will exists, then Congress 
should mandate that a restructuring constitutes an event triggering the 
seller’s obligation to make payment to the purchaser in a credit-
default-swap agreement.  
It stands to reason, however, that this is an implausible outcome. 
Accordingly, this Comment proposes an alternative solution: 
Congress should allow a credit-default-swap seller to refuse to make 
payment because of a bankruptcy if, prior to that bankruptcy, the 
holder does not accept a restructuring offer.161 Congress should adopt 
this solution because it will solve the empty creditor problem, and it is 
more pragmatic politically. Allowing credit-default-swap sellers to 
                                                                                                                   
159 Hemel, supra note 103, at 169.  
160 See Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 3 (discussing the clearing of derivatives contracts). 
161 There are many specifics to actually crafting legislation to this effect, e.g., how do we 
want to define “restructuring offer”? And who has the burden of proving that the holder refused 
a restructuring offer? These issues are beyond the scope of this Comment, but future 
commentators should address them. 
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refuse to make payment because of purchasers’ self-interested 
insistence on bankruptcy eliminates the financial incentive for holders 
to force companies into bankruptcy.  
Imagine Company X offers Investor L a debt-for-equity exchange 
with this rule in place. Assuming that the parties are operating under 
the typical credit-default-swap agreement, L has two options: (1) 
accept the offer and receive equity worth half of the face value of his 
bonds, or (2) refuse the offer and hope that X does not go bankrupt. 
Assume further that the debt-for-equity exchange would have allowed 
X to avoid bankruptcy. If X does file for bankruptcy, Insurance Firm 
Z need not make the $1,000,000 credit-default-swap payout. Because 
the value of bankrupt X’s bonds are likely to be less than the equity 
stake that L could have received in the debt-for-equity deal, this 
regulation forces L to always take restructuring deals that a company 
it invests in offers. Some will argue that this is unfair. But this 
Comment’s proposed rule should not prevent the parties from 
contracting in a way that allows the credit-default-swap holder to 
receive payment upon accepting the restructuring agreement. In other 
words, Congress should permit the parties to adopt the type of 
contract Hemel advocates for: a deal under which the seller agrees to 
pay the purchaser the difference between the value of the purchaser’s 
debt/equity holding after a restructuring and the amount the purchaser 
would have received under the agreement if the underlying debt 
provider had filed for bankruptcy.  
If the parties do craft this type of agreement, credit-default-swap 
purchasers will protect themselves against the loss associated with 
accepting the restructuring deal. This is the type of beneficial hedging 
that we want from credit default swaps, but this type of contract will 
also protect the companies issuing the underlying debt from 
unnecessary bankruptcies.162 In effect, then, this Comment’s proposal 
protects companies, yet it allows credit-default-swap sellers and 
purchasers to contract in a way that preserves the benefits credit 
default swaps provide the market. 
After Congress adopts this Comment’s proposed rule, credit-
default-swap purchasers will bargain for the type of contract Hemel 
proposes to protect themselves. Either way, credit-default-swap 
sellers are better off. First, they are better off because they can avoid a 
large payout if the holder forces the underlying company into 
bankruptcy, assuming the parties do not adopt the type of contract 
Hemel proposes. Second, even if the parties do adopt the type of 
contract Hemel proposes, a seller would still be better off because “its 
                                                                                                                    
162 See supra Part III.B. 
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payout” from a restructuring “would be less than its expected loss in 
the absence of such an exchange.”163  
Moreover, under this Comment’s rule, credit-default-swap holders 
will no longer have an economic incentive to refuse to engage in 
restructurings because they will end up with nothing if they do. 
Likewise, credit-default-swap purchasers no longer have the incentive 
under this proposed rule if the parties adopt the contract Hemel 
proposes because the purchaser is indifferent to the company’s 
bankruptcy.164 If the credit-default-swap purchasers documented the 
contract Hemel proposes, they are not particularly worse off, as their 
only loss is paying more for the swap than they otherwise would. And 
this makes sense because they are the parties benefitting from empty 
creditor syndrome. 
Most importantly, the economy at large is better off as it avoids the 
negative externalities associated with corporate bankruptcy.165 Some 
might argue that this could be a bad outcome because companies in 
this situation might be better off in bankruptcy rather than 
restructuring. If this were true, then the boards and officers of those 
companies, in line with their fiduciary duties to shareholders, would 
be required to file for bankruptcy in the first place. Furthermore, even 
if the companies do end up filing for bankruptcy later, investors can 
still fall back on their credit-default-swap agreements to protect them. 
If, for instance, Investor L’s $500,000 post-exchange equity stake in 
Company X becomes worthless a few months later because X still 
files for bankruptcy, L can look to Insurance Firm Z for that value 
under their credit-default-swap agreement.  
Another concern that might arise from this Comment’s rule, and 
under the type of contract Hemel proposes more generally, is whether 
either causes restructurings that would not otherwise occur. This 
stems from a belief that, because credit-default-swap holders will 
always either (1) be indifferent to—under a Hemel contract—or (2) 
prefer to—under this Comment’s proposed rule alone—restructure, 
even if it does not make economic sense. Under this perspective, if a 
company offering a restructuring knows that its debtholders have 
credit-default-swap agreements, it may try to force through a 
restructuring that is not necessary to prevent bankruptcy, which will 
                                                                                                                   
163 Hemel, supra note 103, at 168. 
164 See supra Part III.A.  
165 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 164 (“[A]n unnecessary bankruptcy causes deadweight 
loss on society as a whole.”); see also Yves Smith, Musings on Credit Default Swaps, NAKED 
CAPITALISM (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/04/musings-on-credit-
default-swaps.html (“[N]egotiations can keep companies out of [bankruptcy], and are also 
necessary for Chapter 11 to succeed. And if a restructurings fail, more job losses result. This too 
is a toll on the real economy.”). 
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naturally harm the credit-default-swap purchasers. Likewise, a credit-
default-swap seller would be troubled by this because, under a Hemel 
contract, it would have to make payment for an unnecessary 
restructuring. 
This concern is overblown, however, because it generally takes 
more than one debtholder to accomplish a restructuring. For example, 
in Six Flags’ bankruptcy, the company required 95 percent of its 
bondholders to agree to the debt-for-equity swap.166 Thus, even if one 
large bondholder—such as Fidelity in Six Flags’ case or Investor L in 
our ongoing example—approves a restructuring, it will still be 
contingent upon independent debtholders agreeing to the deal. 
Presumably, the other debt holders will only accept a restructuring if 
it is truly in the best interest of the creditors as a whole.167 In this way, 
“the interests of the protection seller and those of ‘full creditors’ 
would be aligned,” meaning that “seller could be (reasonably) 
confident that the debt exchange would only occur under 
circumstances that reduced its expected payout.”168  
If this fact does not offer enough security against the inefficient 
outcome,169 credit-default-swap sellers can contract around this 
problem. For example, they could require that a credit-default-swap 
holder who is approached by an underlying company about a 
restructuring notify the seller. The seller could then ensure that the 
holder only accept a restructuring that is necessary by requiring that 
the holder obtain the seller’s approval or even that the holder allow 
the seller to negotiate the restructuring on its behalf. The holder 
should not have a problem with this because, under this proposed rule 
and a contract following Hemel’s proposal, he is hedged whether the 
company takes the restructuring or not. Thus, this Comment’s 
proposed rule would not encourage unnecessary restructurings to the 
detriment of credit-default-swap sellers.  
As this subsection shows, adopting this Comment’s rule. 
Additionally, it avoids the problem that Hemel’s proposal suffers 
from: relying on voluntary compliance by parties that completely 
misinterpreted the risk these derivatives pose in recent years.170 And, 
                                                                                                                   
166 Hemel, supra note 103, at 159.  
167 It is possible that all of the debtholders will own credit default swaps, which would 
make this point moot. This does not, however, seem likely, as not all debtholders will be able to 
afford credit default swaps.   
168 Id. at 168.  
169 This also applies if all of the debtholders own credit default swaps, or at least if enough 
of them to accept the restructuring do. 
170 As noted earlier, “[a]bout 80% of the derivative assets and liabilities carried on the 
balance sheets of 100 companies reviewed by Fitch were held by five banks: JP Morgan Chase, 
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley. Those five banks also 
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most importantly, it accomplishes the goal this Comment started off 
with: preventing credit-default-swap holders from pushing companies 
into premature bankruptcy by refusing to engage in restructuring 
negotiations.  
CONCLUSION 
While “[t]he ultimate impact of the Dodd-Frank Bill on the 
derivatives market will depend in large part on the regulations that the 
[Commodities Futures Trading Commission] and [Securities 
Exchange Commission] promulgate,”171 Congress’s decision not to 
address the risk that credit-default-swap owners might have an 
incentive to encourage, or force, companies into bankruptcy was a 
mistake. Because we can “no longer . . . rel[y] on” the 
“assumption . . . that creditors generally want to keep a solvent firm 
out of bankruptcy,”172 Congress’s error leaves the regulation of credit 
default swaps lacking. As Congress considers ways to increase the 
efficacy of Dodd-Frank, it should recognize that an adjustment to the 
regulation of the credit-default-swap market to include a protection 
against empty creditor syndrome would be valuable for our economy. 
Adopting this Comment’s rule would be a wise start.  
DANTE ALTIERI MARINUCCI† 
                                                                                                                   
 
account for more than 96% of the companies’ exposure to credit derivatives.” Katz, supra note 
74. Under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the federal government provided each of these 
financial institutions with “bailout” funds. Matthew Ericson, Elaine He, & Amy Schoenfeld, 
Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES BUSINESS (last visited Mar. 3, 2012, 10:38 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/200904_CREDITCRISIS/recipients.html. 
171 See Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 6.   
172 The Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the House Comm. 
on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 46 (Oct. 15, 2008) (statement of Henry T. C. Hu: “Credit Default 
Swaps and the Financial Crisis: ‘Interconnectedness’ and Beyond”); see also Daniel Gross, The 
Scary Rise of the “Empty Creditor”, SLATE (Apr. 21, 2009, 3:01 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2009/04/the_scary_rise_of_the_empty_credit
or.html (“[I]f a lender or creditor believes it can profit more from a complete failure—i.e., if it 
has an insurance policy that pays off only in the event of utter devastation—that creditor might 
be more inclined to push a company toward bankruptcy. And thanks to the financial innovations 
of recent years—the rampant use of hedging and credit-default swaps, the ability of investors to 
purchase insurance on debt—that's exactly what seems to be happening. Creditors are acting to 
protect their economic self-interest by encouraging companies to destroy themselves.”). 
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Science, 2009, The Ohio State University. The author thanks Robert Cheren, Benjamin Galea, 
John Murray, Jonathan Munch, Benjamin Ristau, and Daniel Pesciotta for their comments on 
this piece, along with the members of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for their editing 
prowess. Any technical errors or general irrationality in this Comment are the author’s alone.   
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